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COMMENT
THE INSURANCE SYNDROME AND THE
PENNSYLVANIA COURTS
With the increasing number of personal injury suits coming
before the courts, there is an urgent need to reexamine the general
rule of excluding evidence of liability insurance coverage in a trial
for personal injuries.' The rule not only renders the evidence inadmissible, but if perchance it is mentioned at the trial a motion to
withdraw a juror will be entertained and a new trial granted.
The rationale of the exclusionary rule is the immateriality and2
irrelevancy of the fact of insurance to the issue of negligence..
Furthermore, the courts reason that any probative value it might
have is greatly outweighed by the inherently prejudicial effect of
the disclosure upon the jury. As a consequence of this prejudice
the jury will award a verdict to the plaintiff not because the defendant is negligent but because the verdict will be paid for by an
insurance company. For this reason it would be more correct to
speak of prejudice accruing to the insurance company rather than
to the defendant. The rule, although one of fairness in theory,
actually is detrimental to the administration of justice in that it
constantly leads to new trials based on technical errors of procedureA. Moreover, the uncertainty existing as to the status of the
rule reposes an almost unlimited discretion in the trial judge to
either follow the rule or to apply one of its numerous exceptions.
This uncertainty is also reflected in the variant decisions of both
the Superior and Supreme Courts of Pennsylvania. 4 This comment will delineate the rule's operative orbit by examining its
numerous exceptions. Consideration will be given to the future
course of the rule in the Pennsylvania courts.
1. "Evidence that a person was, at the time a harm was suffered by
another, insured wholly or partially against loss arising from liability for
that harm is inadmissible to prove negligence or other wrongdoing."
UNIFORm RULES OF EVIDENCE 54. See also 2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 282(a)
(3rd. ed. 1940); McCoRMICK, EVIDENCE 355 (1954); 1 HENRY, EVIDENCE
§ 14 (1953); 21 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE §§ 12831-41

(1962); Annot., 4 A.L.R.2d 761 (1949).
2. In Brown v. Walter, 62 F.2d 798 (2d Cir. 1933), Justice Learned
Hand addressed himself to the probative value of insurance on- the issue
of negligence.

"There can be no rational excuse, except the flimsy one

that a man is more likely to be careless if insured. That is at most the
merest guess, much more than outweighed by the probability that the

real issues will be obscured." Id. at 800.
3. See 2 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 1.
4.

Compare Lenahan v. Pittston Coal Mining Co., 221 Pa. 626, 70 Atl.

884 (1908), with Kaplan v. Loev, 327 Pa. 465, 194 Atl. 653 (1937).
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DEVELOPMENT

The erratic, but steady, growth of the exclusionary rule can
best be developed by comparing the most recent pronouncement
by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 5 with the original declaration
of the rule.6 In a 4-3 decision the court in Nicholson v. Garris7 affirmed the grant of a new trial when the word "insurance" was
mentioned by plaintiff's counsel. The defendant in a negligence
action had taken the stand to testify in support of his counterclaim for damages sustained by his equipment. On cross-examination plaintiff's counsel produced the defendant's income tax
return and commenced to question the defendant as to his earnings
and expenses. Thereupon the following colloquy occurred: "Q.
Mr. Parr, I show you your income tax return for 1957 . .. and
ask you how much your return states you paid to your drivers.
A. $2,339.31 [here followed the costs of ten specific items].
Q. Insurance." Before the defendant could answer his counsel objected and moved to withdraw a juror. Because the above colloquy occurred during the last hour of a seven day trial, the trial
judge denied the motion and admonished the jury to disregard
the question. The trial judge later granted a new trial based
solely on the injection of insurance into the trial.
The decision failed to consider several interesting factors:
(1) The question was never answered; 9 (2) the defendant, being
a public carrier, was required by law to have protection against
liability; 10 (3) the reference occurred during cross-examination
(4) the
when counsel was attempting to discredit a witness;'
lower court directed the jury to disregard the reference to insurance; and (5) there was no indication of the nature of the
insurance mentioned. Addressing itself to the fifth factor, the trial
5. Nicholson v. Garris, 418 Pa. 146, 210 A.2d 164 (1965).

6.

Hollis v. United States Glass Co., 220 Pa. 49, 69 Ati. 55 (1908).

7. 418 Pa. 146, 210 A.2d 164 (1965).
8. Record, p. 670a. (Emphasis added.)
9. Since counsel was reading from a copy of defendant's income tax

return the want of a reply was not significant.
10. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 66, § 1355 (1959) requires a public carrier to
carry liability insurance unless it can qualify as a self-insurer. In this
case the jury had no way of ascertaining whether the defendant was a
self-insurer. But see Croft v. Hall, 208 S.C. 187, 37 S.E.2d 537 (1946)
wherein the court stated where "insurance is required by a public act
which all citizens are presumed to know' the jurors already have knowledge of such coverage and no prejudice can result [from its disclosure]."
Id. at 193, 37 S.E.2d at 539.
11. The lower court intimated that the cross-examination was not
conducted in good faith or for a legitimate purpose. The court said that
there was no possible evidential value to be gained by having a cost

breakdown for each item of expense.

Record, p. 867(a).

On appeal, the

supreme court stated "it is beyond doubt that counsel asked the question
about Parr's expenditure for insurance intentionally ...
152, 210 A.2d at 166.

"

418 Pa. at
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judge stated: "This argument is fallacious because the mention
of insurance in reference to the owner of a small fleet of tractor
and trailers in which one is involved in a collision definitely
means liability insurance to the jury."'12 He also admitted that
his admonition to the jury failed to cure the error. The dissenters 13 found this reply somewhat less than satisfactory. They
question how the lower court concluded that the insurance referred to was liability insurance instead of fire insurance, cargo
insurance, theft insurance, life insurance, hospitalization insurance or any of the myriad other forms of insurance available to
businessmen.' 4 This decision was "an extreme manifestation of
the insurance syndrome"'15 in their opinion. The majority, notwithstanding these probing questions, upheld the lower court because it "was in a much better position than we are to evaluate
• .. the effect of this reference to insurance on the jury."' 6 Nicholson represents the most extreme extension of the exclusionary rule
to date. Indeed it is difficult to perceive of any further extension
because the mere mention of the word "insurance now presents
sufficient grounds to grant a new trial.
The rule as announced in Nicholson bears but a slight re-7
semblance to its ancestor, Hollis v. United States Glass Co.'
The issue in Hollis arose when plaintiff's counsel remarked in his
closing statement to the jury that "it is nothing to the glass
company what this verdict should be; it is the insurance company that will pay the verdict.""'
In reversing the lower court
and granting a new trial the court adopted the exclusionary rule:
[T] he bringing to the attention of the jury the fact that the
defendant in an action for personal injuries was insured
[is] cause for reversal, whether done by the admission
of testimony or the statement of counsel, or the offers of
proofs, or by questions asked witnesses or jurors. 19
Two prior decisions dealing with improper remarks by coun20
sel were cited as authority for the rule. Walsh v. Wilkes-Barre
involved a remark by plaintiff's counsel that final liability
would be on the lot owner and "the Lehigh and Wilkes-Barre Coal
Company owns the lot."' 21 It was believed that the remark would
tend to increase the award because of the jurors' known antag12.

Record, p. 867a.

13.

J. J. O'Brien, Musmanno and Cohen.

14.

418 Pa. 146, 153, 210 A.2d 164, 167.

15. Id. at 154, 210 A.2d at 167.
16. Id. at 152, 210 A.2d at 167.
17.

220 Pa. 49, 69 Atl. 55 (1908).

18. Id. at 51, 69 Atl. 55-56.
19. Ibid. Most of the rule was obiter dictum since the court was
only faced with an improper statement by counsel.
20. 215 Pa. 226, 64 Atl. 407 (1906). The trial judge did not admonish
the jury to disregard the statement. Nor was it withdrawn from the jury.
21. Id. at 226, 64 Atl. at 408.

Fall 1965]

COMMENT

onism to large corporations. In the second case, Saxton v. Pittsburgh Ry., 22 counsel for the plaintiff made this appeal to the
jury: "I ask you to make this company out of its million to put
on that stump a foot as good as the original. '28 This statement,
remarked the court, was an invitation "to find a verdict on false
grounds.'24 Clearly these cases represent obvious attempts to
prejudice the jury. Counsels' motives cannot be mistaken on such
occasions. A cursory examination of Hollis, Walsh, Saxton and
Nicholson, however, reveals certain fundamental distinctions. In
Hollis counsel made a potentially prejudicial remark to the jury;
the reference in Nicholson was an innocuous question in the
course of cross-examination. There was no doubt remaining in
Hollis that the defendant was insured and that the insurance
company would pay the verdict, while in Nicholson there was
serious doubt whether the defendant was protected by insurance.
In fairness to the Nicholson court, however, it must be noted that
the exclusionary rule had been previously corrupted in a long
line of cases.
This corrupting process commenced with Lenahan v. Pittston
Coal Mining Co.,25 decided in the same year as Hollis and, more
surprisedly, by the same court. The court, after repeating the
Hollis rule, added this caveat: "The rulings [of the cited cases]
will be strictly adhered to and rigidly enforced, and no evasion or
circumvention of them by indirection will be tolerated. '26 With
equal force and clarity the court proceeded to circumvent its own
prior unequivocal ruling by announcing an exception to the rule.
That exception pertains to a party's constitutional right to crossexamine a witness. 27 Thus Lenahan has assumed a dual character and has become a dream case for both plaintiff's and defendant's counsel. It can be cited for the proposition that the exclusionary rule is rigid and no equivocation will be permitted. Plaintiff's counsel can cite it as allowing certain exceptions to supercede
the rule's efficacy since Lenahan impliedly condones the application of other exceptions. This proposition is supported by the fact
that the majority of cases which have been appealed to the higher
courts of Pennsylvania subsequent to Lenahan were decided by
the application of an exception rather than by the application of
the rule itself.
This is not to suggest that the rule is only paid lip service by
22. 219 Pa. 492, 68 Ati. 1022 (1908). Cf. Curran v. Lorch, 243 Pa.
247, 90 Ati. 62 (1914) (error to refuse motion to withdraw juror when
insurance was mentioned on cross-examination); Brown v. City of Scranton,
231 Pa. 593, 80 Atl. 1113 (1911)

see also
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

(evidence of indemnity bond inadmissible);

Conover v. Bloom, 269 Pa. 548, 112 Ati. 752 (1921).
219 Pa. at 495, 68 Atl. at 1022.
Id. at 495, 68 Ati. at 1023.
221 Pa. 626, 70 Atl. 884 (1908).
Id. at 629, 70 Ati. at 884.
See Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687 (1931).
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the court.2 s To the contrary, the rule has vigorous vitality where
an exception cannot be rationalized. Thus when defendant's counsel reiterated in his summation to the jury that since there was
insurance in the case a false recovery would cause insurance rates
to rise and ultimately the jurors would be the losers, a new trial
was granted and affirmed. With characteristic frankness, Justice
Musmanno replied: "To throw over the jury an entangling net of
self-interest would be to make a mockery of justice. '29 Another
3 0 presented a situation in which
interesting case, Patton v. Franc,
defendant's counsel solicited from the defendant on direct examination the existence of insurance. He then asked whether the
defendant had any financial responsibility in the outcome of the
case to which the defendant answered in the negative. The theory
behind such an examination was to bolster the defendant's credibility by showing that he had no motive to tell a falsehood since
he would not be monetarily affected by an adverse verdict. The
theory is fallacious because more than money is at stake in a suit
of this nature. Reputation and vanity are also involved. There
is also a strong likelihood that the defendant's insurance premiums
would be increased, if not cancelled, by an adverse verdict.
A novel approach to circumventing the rule was attempted in
Trimble v. Merloe,31 decided one year prior to Nicholson. In his
closing remarks to the jury plaintiff's- counsel said that jurors
often ask counsel why insurance is not mentioned at the trial.
Replying to his rhetorical question, he stated that it is unimportant whether the defendant was insured and that they should
arrive at a verdict free from any prejudice. He then emphasized
that at no time did he mention whether the defendant had insurance. A bare majority of the court stated that it would be naive
to accept the unrealistic assumption that counsel's argument was
not a conscious and deliberate attempt to build his case. 32 The
dissent emphasized the value of such a comment in aiding the jury
to remove irrelevances which may lurk in their minds.33 Trimble
can be distinguished from both Patton and Finney in that the jury
had no way of knowing whether the defendant had insurance. It
has been suggested that a charge of this nature by the court at the
culmination of every negligence trial would "expunge the thought
28.

But see Fleischman v. Reading, 388 Pa. 183, 198, 130 A.2d 429,

436 (1957) (B. Jones, J., dissenting) wherein it is stated that the majority
honors the rule only in its breach.
29.

Finney v. G. C. Murphy Co., 400 Pa. 46, 50, 161 A.2d 385, 387

(1960).

30. 404 Pa. 306, 172 A.2d 297 (1961).
31. 413 Pa. 408, 197 A.2d 457 (1964).
32. The defendant would face a dilemma if such a comment was
admissible. If he did not comment he would be at a disadvantage. A
comment by the defendant, however, might be considered a waiver of
his objection.
33. 413 Pa. 408, 413, 197 A.2d 457, 460.
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of insurance" from every juror's deliberations.3 4 Perhaps the only
error committed in Trimble was that counsel's perceptive comment
was spoken five or ten years too early.
The exclusionary rule also applies to cases where the plaintiff's
insurance coverage is revealed. The leading case, Lengle v. North
Lebanon Township,3 5 centered around the disclosure that the
plaintiff's children had received compensation payments. The
offer of proof to admit both the agreement and the amounts received was to show that the plaintiff could not maintain a cause of
action in the name of her children. Reversing a verdict for the
defendant, the court stated that regardless of the offer of proof the
real purpose was to show that the children were being taken care
of by the state. The court concluded that under such circumstances plaintiff's chance of recovery was materially injured. A
similar issue was presented in Blatt v. Davis Construction Co.3 6
Here, as in Lengle, both the terms of the contract and amount
received were admitted over plaintiff's objection. Ostensibly the
purpose for its admission was to attack the plaintiff's credibility,
but it was held that such evidence could not possibly establish the
point in controversy. This branch of the exclusionary rule is
predicated on the assumption that while workmen's compensation
payments are adequate from the legislative viewpoint, they should
37
not be considered as representing total compensation for a wrong.
An injured party is regarded as having an independent cause of
action against a tortfeasor other than the employer
without regard
3 8
to any payments received from an outside source.
A refusal to apply the rule in these situations would reveal
that fairness is not the real motive behind the rule. This is especially true when there is not only a mere reference to insurance
payments but the admission of both the agreement and the amount
received under the contract. Nothing is left to the juror's imagination in such cases. The natural reaction would be to deduct a
corresponding sum from the verdict.
rt is difficult to reconcile the court's decision in Rice v. Shenk39
with Blatt. Here plaintiff admitted under cross-examination that
he had received payments from an insurance company. A verdict
34. McDonald, Insurance Against Liability: An Anomaly in NegliDICK. L. REV. 19, 33 (1960).
35. 274 Pa. 51, 117 Atl. 403 (1922).

gence Cases, 65
36.

184 Pa. Super. 30, 133 A.2d 576 (1957).

37. See, e.g., Lobalzo v. Varoli, 409 Pa. 15, 185 A.2d 557 (1962);

Palandro v. Bollinger, 409 Pa. 296, 186 A.2d 11 (1962); cf. Moidel v.
Peoples Natural Gas Co., 397 Pa. 212, 154 A.2d 399 (1959); Ridgeway v.
Sayre Electric Co., 258 Pa. 400, 102 Atl. 123 (1917).

38. The employer or insurance company has the right to be subrogated in any verdict recovered for the amount to be paid by virtue of
the Workmen Compensation Board's award. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 671
(Supp. 1964).
39. 293 Pa. 524, 143 Ati. 231 (1928).
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for the defendant was affirmed because the jury had found for the
defendant and, therefore, it was impossible for the evidence to
minimize the damages. The fallacy of this argument is obvious.
The very reason why the jury did not find for the plaintiff may
have been the prejudicial effect of the evidence. Such evidence
can do more than mitigate damages; it can defeat a favorable
verdict as well.
40
EXCEPTIONS TO THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE

Disclosure On Cross-examination
The exclusionary rule is not an absolute one. Theoretically,
whenever the evidential value flowing from the disclosure of insurance is greater than the possible prejudice to the defendant, the
reference to insurance will be admitted. Nowhere is this fine
balancing act more acute than in the right to cross-examine a
witness. Cross-examination is more than a privilege, it is a constitutionally protected right.41 It is not surprising, therefore, that
the exclusionary rule must give ground to such a right when in
conflict. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court so held in Lenahan v.
Pittston Coal Mining Co. 42 In this case defendant's co-counsel
was called to impeach one of the plaintiff's witnesses. On crossexamination he admitted that he represented a casualty company
which had insured the defendant. The court, in affirming a verdict for the plaintiff, upheld the right to cross-examine by holding
that:
The right is not to be denied or abridged because incidentally facts may be developed that are irrelevant to the
issue and prejudicial to the other party.
This chance the
43
party takes when he calls the witness.
This decision preserves the right to impeach a witness who is
biased or has an interest in the case when the cross-examination
is conducted in good faith. Unfortunately this good faith requirement has lead some courts to the44 conclusion that every mention
of insurance is an act of bad faith.
Despite the soundness of the exception, it stands in serious
doubt as a result of the decision in Kaplan v. Loev. 45 In Kaplan,
the plaintiff sought to attack the credibility of defendant's witness. The issue was whether the witness, who was a passenger in
defendant's car at the time of the accident, had signed a release
40. Several of the following cases could be classified under more
than one category. In this comment they are classified under that category which the author considers the chief reason for the decision.
41.

Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687 (1931).

42. 221 Pa. 626, 70 Atl. 884 (1908); See DiTommaso v. Syracuse Univ.,
172 App. Div. 34, 158 N.Y. Supp. 175 (1916).

43.
44.
45.

221 Pa. at 629, 70 Atl. at 885.
See note 11 supra.
327 Pa. 465, 194 Atl. 653 (1937).
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with defendant's insurance company. A conference at side bar
established that the witness had signed a release. The lower court
denied plaintiff the right to cross-examine on the grounds that in
order for the witness to tell the whole truth about the transaction,
the jury might discover that the defendant was covered by insurance. A verdict for the defendant was affirmed, in a 4-3 decision, on the assumption that the case involved was an adroit
attempt, executed in bad faith, to reveal before the jury the "forbidden" fact. A moment's reflection will disclose the untenability
of the decision. It holds that a witness may claim and accept
money from the defendant's insurance company and then deny
under oath that the defendant was not liable for the accident in
which the witness claimed damage without fear of cross-examination. 46 To say that counsel was acting in bad faith is equally
indefensible. It is doubtful whether Kaplan would be followed
today. 47 The case, however, does stand for the wide and practically complete discretion in the trial judge in the matter of
cross-examination.
Participationby Insurance Company
A related conflict is posed when the plaintiff gives a statement
to an insurance adjuster. The statement is subsequently introduced into evidence as a declaration against interest. A question
then arises whether the plaintiff may divulge the identity of the
person who took the statement. Fleischman v. Reading4s answered this question in the affirmative:
Candor and fair dealing dictate that when an insurance
company undertakes to participate in a trial to the extent
that it produces a paper, allegedly signed by the plaintiff,
who repudiates the paper, the insurance company should
not be allowed to conceal its interest behind a misty curtain of anonymity. 49
A subsequent case, Beardsley v. Weaver,50 suggests a backtracking
from Fleischman. On similar facts the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court reversed an order for a new trial by the court en banc following a verdict for the defendant. The trial judge had denied
plaintiff the right to testify that the scrivener of his statement was
an insurance agent. The plaintiff, however, admitted that the
averments in the statement were correct. Therefore, the credibility of the scrivener was not in issue. On this factual distinction
contrary decisions were rendered.
46. Id. at 478, 194 AtI. at 661 (dissenting opinion).
47. See Fleischman v. Reading, 388 Pa. 183, 130 A.2d 429 (1957).
48. Ibid.
49. Id. at 190, 130 A.2d at 433. See Taylor v. Ross, 50 Ohio L. Abs.
577, 78 N.E.2d 395 (Ct. App. 1948); Webb v. Hoover-Guernsey Dairy Co.,
138 Ore. 24, 4 P.2d 631 (1931).
50. 402 Pa. 130, 166 A.2d 529 (1961).
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An example of how the rule can effectively deprive a party of
making known pertinent facts is emphasized in Sloniger v. Enterline.51 Defendant's counsel, on cross-examination of plaintiff's
witness, questioned her about a conversation which she had with
one of plaintiff's counsel prior to the trial. The trial judge permitted this cross-examination but refused to allow the witness to
testify that she had spoken with defendant's counsel (who was
representing defendant's insurance company) prior to the conversation with plaintiff's counsel for fear she might blurt out that
he was from an insurance company. Query, is the rationale of
the exclusionary rule one of fairness toward one party only? If
so, the rule is untenable. Certainly fairness dictates that the rule
should not be utilized to prevent a party from rebutting a damaging inference by revealing the truth. The law should not condone an evidential rule which favors one party over another, for
the real purpose of a trial is to arrive at the truth. The impact of
the Sloniger rule is to suppress the truth rather than to disclose it.
Vague or Indefinite Reference
This exception is best illustrated by King v. Keller52 wherein
the court stated that "the thing prohibited by the rule is bringing
to the attention of the jury in any way the fact that the defendant
. . . is protected from liability by an insurance company which
must pay any verdict rendered. ' 53 A fortiori, any reference to an
insurance company or representative which is so vague that it is
impossible for the jury to determine whether the defendant is
insured does not violate the rule. The exception is most often
called into play when a witness states that he gave a statement to
an insurance man or conversed with a lawyer from the insurance
company. Statements such as "there was an adjuster on it and
he looked it over and he agreed to it" 5 4 and "one of the insurance
company's lawyers came to my place and told me to tell the
story" 55 are typical expressions which were held to be so vague as
to be nonprejudicial.5 6
51.
52.

400 Pa. 457, 162 A.2d 397 (1960).
90 Pa. Super. 596 (1927). There were four separate references to

insurance during the trial. All the references were made by the plaintiff
or plaintiff's witnesses.
53. Id. at 605.
54. Richardson v. Wilkes-Barre Transit Corp., 172 Pa. Super. 636,
95 A.2d 365 (1953 no error in refusing to withdraw juror).
55.

McCaulif v. Griffith, 110 Pa. Super. 522, 168 Atl. 536 (1933).

The lower court, after denying defendant's motion to withdraw a juror,
charged the jury to disregard any mention of insurance. An exception
was subsequently taken to this charge.

Replying to this exception the

superior court stated that "defendant should not in fairness, urge as error
the portion of a charge necessitated by what counsel urged in his own
objection to testimony in itself not objectionable."

Id.

at 535-36, 168

Atl. at 541.
56. The injection of insurance into the trial is apparently prejudicial
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This exception affords the trial judge and, to a lesser degree,
the appellate courts, tremendous discretion in enforcing the rule.
For instance, the reference to insurance in Nicholson was undoubtedly vague, yet a new trial was granted and affirmed.5 7
Unresponsive and Unexpected References
Frequently a witness will volunteer an answer which is unresponsive to the question asked. In a negligence trial the unresponsive answer might refer to an insurance company or agent.
The courts recognizing the complete innocence of counsel, have
adopted a lenient attitude toward such occurrences. Consequently,
another exception to the exclusionary rule was conceived. It is
submitted, however, that a reference to insurance is either prejudicial or it is not, irrespective of how it is injected into the trial,
unless, of course, the reference is within another exception. The
courts, nonetheless, have failed to draw any such distinctions in
this area.
The reference in Denney v. Krauss58 positively established
that the defendant was protected by liability insurance. The defendant on cross-examination was asked whether he had had any
conversation with a particular passenger in his car while he was
driving his wife to the hospital following the accident. He replied
that they were taking her to the hospital and that he had insurance. This reference to insurance was found to be nonprejudicial,
but the court may have been influenced by the fact that it was the
defendant who injected insurance into the trial. The unresponsive
reference in Keefer v. Lombardi,59 on the other hand, was indefinite and could have come within the purview of the vagueness
exception. A witness was asked whether he was required to determine the size of dynamite blasts in his work as an inspector. He
replied, "yes, and we had the insurance companies." 60 In another
case decided under this exception, the reference to insurance was
per se. Therefore a finding that the verdict was excessive is not necessary.
However, a few cases do state or imply that the verdict was excessive, e.g.,
Nicholson v. Garris, 418 Pa. 146, 210 A.2d 164 (1965), or not excessive,
e.g., King v. Keller, 90 Pa. Super. 596 (1927); Lambert v. Polen, 346 Pa.
352, 30 A.2d 115 (1943).
57. But see Rodgers v. Ashley, .207 F.2d 534 (3d Cir. 1953) (reference
to insurance company nonprejudicial); Bortz v. Henne, 415 Pa. 150, 204
A.2d 52 (1964) (per curiam) (reference to insurance adjuster nonprejudicial); Amey v. Erb, 296 Pa. 561, 146 Atl. 141 (1929) (reference to doctor

from insurance company nonprejudicial).
58. 394 Pa. 380, 147 A.2d 369 (1959). A second reference to an insurance representative was also made by the defendant. This statement
was held to be within the vagueness doctrine.
59. 376 Pa. 367, 102 A.2d 695 (1954); cf. Hendrickson v. Quaker
City Cab Co., 84 Pa. Super. 218 (1924) (witness volunteered statement

relating to men from an insurance company).
60. 376 Pa. at 374, 102 A.2d at 698.
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induced by the court itself. 61 In reply to the trial judge's question concerning the location of a certain piece of paper, the witness
stated that he took it to the shop so that they could give it to the
insurance people. This reference was held to be unresponsive to
the question asked and therefore did not violate the rule.
Relevancy to Issue of Negligence
There are two issues to be resolved in every negligence suit:
(1) Is the defendant negligent and (2) if negligent, what damages
were suffered by the plaintiff. Usually any evidence which has
probative value to these issues may be admitted. The reason why
the fact of insurance liability is not admissible is because it generally has no probative value 62 and any value which it might have
is greatly outweighed by its prejudicial effect to the defendant or
the plaintiff. There are rare instances, however, where the disclosure of insurance is relevant to the issue of negligence63 or
damages. Such a situation was presented in Jury v. New York
Cent. R.R. 64 when the defendant answered that a release executed
by the plaintiff barred the action. The release did not include
damages to the vehicle as covered by a certain insurance policy
carried by the plaintiff. Although the release and accompanying
insurance policy were relevant to show what damages were covered by the policy, to admit it would inject into the trial the fact
that plaintiff was protected by an insurance policy and would
therefore be compensated for the damage irrespective of the
jury's verdict. The trial judge first ruled that the release was inadmissible, but then granted a new trial, which was affirmed by
the Pennsylvania Superior Court:
[T]he release was relevant testimony . . . in determining
how much the defendant should, in addition to the amount
set forth in the release, pay to the plaintiff. Evidence,
therefore, as to the coverage of the insurance policy is as
material and relevant to the jury's disposition of the case
as is evidence of defendant's negligence. 65
A related problem arises when a written contract containing
an insurance clause is sought to be admitted into evidence. As a
general rule either all or none of a contract may be introduced. 66
61. Cain v. Kohlman, 344 Pa. 63, 22 A.2d 667 (1942).
62. See note 2 supra.
63. See Herschensohn v. Newman, 80 N.H. 557, 119 Ati. 705 (1923)
where testimony concerning insurance was admissible as having probative value on the issue of defendant's negligence. The defendant had
told a passenger in his car not to worry about his driving too fast for he
carried insurance for that. The court thought that this evidence reflected
on the defendant's state of mind prior to the accident and was therefore
relevant.
64. 167 Pa. Super. 244, 74 A.2d 531 (1950).
65. Id. at 247-48, 74 A.2d at 532.
66. E.g., Cary v. Cary, 189 Pa. 65, 42 Ati. 19 (1899).
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It is thought to be unfair to allow a party to introduce that portion
of a contract which is advantageous and to withhold any portion
that harms his case. The lower court in Capozi v. Hearst Publishing Co.,67 followed the general rule and admitted a relevant
contract which disclosed that the defendant was insured. On appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed, holding that the
provision had no probative value on the issue of the legal relationship of the joint defendants. The decision does imply, however, that the insurance clause would have been admissible if it
were relevant. As pronounced by the Capozi court, the test governing the admissibility of documents in which insurance is mentioned is whether the exclusion of the prejudicial document "adversely affects the party insisting upon the introduction of the
document in its entirety." 68 In other words, is the prejudicial
effect to the party seeking the document's exclusion outweighed
by the adverse consequences to the introducting party. Illustrative of this test is a case where the lessee and lessor are joint
defendants in a negligence action. 69 On the issue of control one
relevant indicia would be the terms of the lease agreement. If the
lease contains a provision for public liability insurance, a legal
question arises whether this clause casts any light on the issue of
control. Capozi will allow its admission if the question is an70
swered in the affirmative.
No examination of this exception would be complete without a
reference to the early case of Randall v. Gould.7 1 At issue in an
action for ejectment was whether the defendant had notice of
fraud in his title when he purchased the contested property. An
offer of proof that the defendant had purchased extra title insurance noting the existence of the plaintiff's claim was accepted.
Reference Induced or Volunteered by Defendant
The courts are adverse to enforcing the exclusionary rule
where defendant's counsel has been overly aggressive in crossexamination causing the witness to mention insurance. The72soundness of the exception was affirmed in Ellsworth v. Lauth:
[I]t would be an anachronism to apply [the rule] in favor
of a defendant who himself educed the evidence to which
he objects, without plaintiff being in any
73 way responsible,
directly or indirectly, for its production.
67. 371 Pa. 503, 92 A.2d 177 (1952).
68. Id. at 519, 92 A.2d at 184.
69. Dively v. Penn-Pittsburg Corp., 332 Pa. 65, 2 A.2d 831 (1938)
(disclosure by co-defendant).

70.

Cf. Scranton Gas & Water Co. v. Weston, 63 Pa. Super. 570

(1916) (admissibility of whole conversation).
71. 225 Pa. 42, 73 Atl. 986 (1909).
72. 311 Pa. 286, 166 Atl. 855 (1933).

73. Id. at 290, 166 Atl. at 856.
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No doubt remains to the efficacy of this7 4exception as subsequent
cases have cited Ellsworth with approval.
75
It is appropriate to note the case of Portner v. Wible Bros.
while examining this exception. Counsel for plaintiff, after calling the defendant's truck driver, was surprised by the witness's
testimony. He immediately confronted the witness with a signed
statement which contradicted his testimony. After denying the
accuracy of the statement the witness was asked by the court
whether he did not care about signing a statement that was not
true. "I thought he was from our insurance company" was his
reply.7 6 The court refused to withdraw a juror since the remark
was volunteered by a witness obviously hostile to the plaintiff.
One can only speculate on the degree of acceptance by the public
of such an attitude toward insurance reports. The veracity of all
insurance reports and statements would certainly be suspect if
this attitude were generally accepted.
Curing of Prejudice
How effective is an admonition to the jury to disregard a
reference to insurance injected into the trial? Although the
Pennsylvania courts are not in unanimity on this question, several
observations can be made. Generally the courts do not distinguish
between cases in which the admonition to the jury was made
77
simultaneously with an order to strike the reference to insurance
7
and those made in the court's charge to the jury.
As a general
practice, however, the jury is admonished at both occasions. 79 A
more basic observation is whether an instruction to the jury, in
and of itself, is sufficient to cure any prejudice occurring from the
reference to insurance. Usually there is a justification, vis-a-vis
exception, for the reference and the admonition merely strengthens the court's decision when a motion to withdraw a juror is
denied. Thus the admonition's exact role is difficult to determine. The case of Keefer v. Lombardis ° does offer some guidance,
although it was also within the unresponsive reply exception.
Nevertheless, the following instructions were held to cure any
prejudice:
74. Tuttle v. Suznevich, 394 Pa. 614, 149 A.2d 888 (1959); Harriett v.
Ballas, 383 Pa. 124, 117 A.2d 693 (1955); Lambert v. Polen, 346 Pa. 352,
30 A.2d 115 (1943); Knapp v. Willys-Ardmore, Inc., 174 Pa. Super. 90,
100 A.2d 105 (1953).
75. 91 Pa. Super. 522 (1927).
76. Id. at 524.
77. E.g., Keefer v. Lombardi, 376 Pa. 367, 102 A.2d 695 (1954).
78. E.g., Harriett v. Ballas, 383 Pa. 124, 117 A.2d 693 (1955).
The

defendant in Harriett argued that an accumulation of complaints called
for a mistrial. The court replied that "since no one of the reasons advanced for a new trial possesses merit, we do not see how an accumulation of zeros can add up to more than zero." Id. at 131, 117 A.2d at 696.
79.
80.

King v. Keller, 90 Pa. Super 596 (1927).
376 Pa. 367, 102 A.2d 695 (1954).
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[T] his witness had inadvertently made reference to an insurance company. I do not know whether an insurance
company is involved in this transaction or not, but in any
event, we are not concerned with that, and whether there
is or not, that is not to influence you one iota in your
deliberations. 8 '
Similar instructions, however, were held not to cure the prejudicial
effect on the jury in Fleet CarrierCorp. V. Lahere.82 This decision
can be distinguished from Keefer on the nature of the reference.
In Fleet counsel for the plaintiff remarked that the defendant will
not have to pay one cent of the verdict. Considered in this light
the cases can be reconciled.
The charge given in King v. Keller5 ' is frequently cited as
authority for the curative effect of proper instructions to the jury.
The trial judge, cognizant of the onerous task before him, gave
this charge:
We can strike it off the record, but we cannot always
strike it out of the minds of the jurors. We cannot tell
you to forget something, because if we told you to forget
something it might make you remember it; but we can
instruct you and you can follow our instructions to this extent, that you are to decide this case between the plaintiffs
considering any reference to
and this defendant without
84
any insurance company.
Other Exceptions
From time to time other exceptions have been created as a
result of unique factual situations. Illustrative of this proposition
is Strout v. American Stores Co. 8 5 Here the court refused to
withdraw a juror when a witness for the defense revealed that he
was a representative of an insurance company. The court said
that in considering the obvious magnitude of the defendant's
operation, it would make little difference to the jury whether the
defendant was insured or not. Although this exception has a
81.
82.

Id. at 374, 102 A.2d at 699.
184 Pa. Super. 201, 132 A.2d 723 (1957); cf. Martin v. Baden

Borough, 233 Pa. 452, 83 Ati. 284 (1912) (reference to contract); Fisher v.
Delaware, L. & W. R. R., 227 Pa. 635, 76 AtI. 718 (1910) (reference to
value of land set by viewers).
83. 90 Pa. Super. 596 (1927).
84. Id. at 605. But see James Stewart & Co. v. Newby, 266 Fed.
287 (4th Cir. 1920) wherein the court said:
[T]he poision is of such character that, once being injected into
the mind, it is difficult of eradication. Where it is allowed to
remain during the whole course of a trial . . . the antidote of a
final instruction to disregard the testimony is ineffective. The
removal of the fly does not restore an appetite for the food into
which it has fallen.
Id. at 295.
35. 385 Pa. 230, 122 A.2d 797 (1956).
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limited applicability, the decision may signal a judicial concern of
the rule's present utility. Another exception may arise when a
question pertaining to insurance coverage is not answered.8 6
THE RULE'S FUTURE COURSE

At least two compelling reasons dictate a reexamination of the
exclusionary rule. The first is directed at the rule's rationale.
The second questions the effect of the rule on the just and expeditious administration of justice.
It must be conceded that the mention of insurance at a trial is
generally immaterial and irrelevant. Is it, however, so prejudicial
to the defendant's (or plaintiff's) rights that a new trial must be
granted whenever it appears? Insurance companies were in their
infancy when the exclusionary rule was first formulated. Safety
devices on automobiles and trains were crude, if not nonexistent,
with the result that many serious accidents occurred unnecessarily. Large corporations were springing up from a basic agrarian
society. All of these factors tended to prejudice a juror toward
large insurance companies in favor of an injured plaintiff. Today,
in contrast to fifty years ago, insurance companies are freely accepted as a common fact of the American way of life. More than
seventy-five percent of all vehicles in the United States are insured
against liability."7 It is also unlikely that a negligence case would
ever go to trial if the defendant were not insured. These facts
have behooved several courts to reconsider the exclusionary rule.
8
A California court in Causey v. Cornelius,
" addressing itself to
the basic issue of prejudice, remarked that it was time to reappraise the insurance bugaboo. It suggested that it is "naive conceit" to think that a juror will give an excessive award if an insurance company must pay the verdict.8 9 An Illinois court has
stated that "the public acquaintance with and attitude toward
liability insurance is far different today than it was in ...
1909."10
Combined with this changing attitude toward insurance companies is an awareness of the court's "hypocritical futility" 91 in
86. Sperry v. White Star Lines, Inc., 315 Pa. 361, 172 Ati. 646 (1934);
see O'Brien v. Bernoi, 297 Mass. 271, 8 N.E.2d 780 (1937).
87. Maryott, Automobile Accidents and Financial Responsibility, 287
ANNALS 83 (1953).
88. 164 Cal. App.2d 269, 330 P.2d 468 (Dist. Ct. App. 1958).

89.

The court was concerned with the strong effort by insurance

companies to inject -insurance into the trial. Prospective jurors are
warned, via advertising media, not to be overly generous with an insurance company's money for otherwise the cost of every service and article
which they purchase will increase. See People ex rel. Barton v. American
Auto. Ins. Co., 130 Cal. App.2d 317, 282 P.2d 559 (Dist. Ct. App. 1955).
90. Pinkerton v. Oak Park Nat'l Bank, 16 Ill. App.2d 91, 97, 147
N.E.2d 390, 394 (1958).

91.

See 2 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 1.
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blinding themselves to the fact that the average juror knows that
the defendant is insured. 9 2 A juror "doesn't need a brick to fall
on him to give him an idea. ' 93 Certainly the juror's common
doubt on the rule's efficacy,
knowledge of insurance casts 9serious
4
if not destroying it completely.
It is submitted that the following opinion of the Minnesota
Supreme Court places the exclusionary rule in its proper perspective:
We think too much is made of the fact that parties to an
automobile collision carry insurance. It is safe to assert
that the majority of every jury .. .comes from families
owning cars carrying liability insurance. Every person
fit to be a juror knows that none but the wholly irresponsible and reckless fail to carry liability insurance. ... So
long as the insurance is not featured or made the basis at
the trial for an appeal to increase or decrease the damages,
the information would seem to be without prejudice.9 5
Although the complete abolition of the exclusionary rule is the
best solution to the insurance syndrome, a compromise in the
nature of the above opinion would at least be preferable to the
present rule. Instead of listing exceptions to the rule, a reference
to insurance would be either prejudicial or non-prejudicial depending upon the nature of the remark. Under this rule a reference would be nonprejudicial unless it constituted a flagrant appeal to the jury that they should find for plaintiff because the
defendant was insured. A specific finding by the court that the
verdict was either excessive or not based upon the evidence
would be required for the granting of a new trial. Such a rule
would prevent future decisions such as Nicholson.
The exclusionary rule is based on the premise that the mere
mention of insurance will prejudice the jury to such an extent
that they will arrive at a false verdict. Accepting, arguendo, the
validity of this premise, is the interest against possible prejudice
commensurate with the rule's attendant evils? A rule of evidence
must have predictibility if it is to be properly observed and enforced. Otherwise confusion and evasion will ensue. The end results of unpredictibility are constant appeals and new trials based
solely on technical errors, thereby further clogging our already
crowded courts. A simple law suit to recover damages for per92.
93.

See Rains v. Rains, 97 Colo. 99, 46 P.2d 740 (1935).
Connelly v. Nolte, 237 Iowa 114, 132, 21 N.W.2d 311, 320 (1946).

94. Of course, the adoption of a direct action statute would render
the exclusionary rule moot. See LA. REv. STAT. tit. 22, § 655 (1958);
WIs. STAT. §§ 85.93, 260.11 (1953). Moreover, the rule is reduced to a near
absurdity in those jurisdictions which permit counsel the right to question
prospective jurors on voir dire about their possible interest in a liability
insurance company. See, e.g., Elford v. Hiltabrand, 63 Cal. App.2d 65,
146 P.2d 510 (Dist. Ct. App. 1944); McCoRmIcK, op. cit. supra note 1,
at 356.
95. Odegard v. Connolly, 211 Minn. 342, 345, 1 N.W.2d 137, 139 (1941).

80

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70

sonal injuries can suddenly be transformed into a costly series of
appeals and new trials by the mere mention of the word insurance.
That the exclusionary rule is unpredictable is not surprising.
Any rule that is better known by its exceptions than by the
rule itself is inherently unsound. Such a rule, apart from placing
almost unlimited discretion in the trial judge, is also unfair to
unsuspecting counsel. The fact that the reference to insurance
might be deemed nonprejudicial does not make the rule more
palatable because the courts are not consistent in their rulings.
Since insurance is destined to play an increasing role in all
phases of our personal and professional lives, it will be virtually
impossible to prevent some mention of it from being injected into
a personal injury trial. The rule in its present form is inadequate
to meet this challenge. Apparently, however, the Pennsylvania
courts are too engrossed in discovering new exceptions to take
time to reexamine the validity of the rule itself.
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